Bribery of Local Government Politicians Pauperization of Pensioners and the Middle Class
Supreme Court of Florida. Tunnicliff and Georg N. Kinderman, Tallahassee, for respondent. Frumkes and Cynthia L. We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3 b 4Florida Constitution, and reverse that portion of the ruling which would require the trial court to close its eyes to such benefits in calculating an equitable distribution of property.
While the First District certified two questions in its opinion, we focus upon the second. The first question certified read as follows: We need not expound upon the above question, which we answered in the negative in Marcoux v.
As we noted in Marcoux, nothing in either Conner or Kuvin limits the "reasonableness" review set forth in Canakaris. The parties involved in this appeal, both now in their early fifties, were married in and over their thirty-year marriage raised four children.
Diffenderfer began engineering school shortly after the marriage. Diffenderfer worked as a part-time nurse and gave birth to two sons. Subsequently, he began work with the Federal Highway Administration, for which he has worked ever since, and she continued to work part-time during the marriage and care for the children.
She also received, as rehabilitative alimony, the right to exclusive use and possession of the marital home as long as she remains unmarried.
Through a heavy-handed review, the First District left no part of the above distribution untouched. First, it remanded for possible application of the special equity formula set out in Landay v. Prior to discussing this view, it may be helpful to examine the nature of the asset involved.
Upon appeal, the First District, citing Witcig v. Marriage of Brown, P. We find persuasive the following observations of the New York Court of Appeals: Whether the [pension] plan is contributory or noncontributory, the employee receives a lesser present compensation plus the contractual right to the future benefits payable under the pension plan.
The value of those contractual rights will vary depending upon the number of years employed but where, as here, the rights are vested, or where they are matured, they have an actuarially calculable value. To the extent that they result from employment time after marriage and before commencement of a matrimonial action, they are contract rights of value, received in lieu of higher compensation which would otherwise have enhanced either marital assets or the marital standard of living and, therefore, are marital property.
We accordingly find that the First District erred in its analysis and its resulting wholesale rejection of the delicate balance struck by the trial court through its scheme of property distribution.
To adopt the position taken by the First District below would, in effect, place an artificial blinder upon the trial judge, and limit that discretion which is so essential to the doing of equity on the facts of each particular case.
Our seminal decision of Canakaris v. While the remedy had traditionally been based on "need," or "upon some economic contribution by the wife to the accumulation of property," Colucci v.
It created, in effect, a hybrid based on concepts of both property distribution, requiring "a justification for such lump sum payment," So. This Court has continued to honor the broad discretionary authority necessary to do equity between the parties.
We affirm, however, its holding that such benefits may be considered as a source of payment of permanent periodic alimony. Obviously, however, injustice would result if the trial court were to consider the same asset in calculating both property distribution and support obligations.
We therefore hasten to reiterate the warning set out in Canakaris: The judge possesses broad discretionary authority to do equity between the parties and has available various remedies to accomplish this purpose, including lump sum alimony, permanent periodic alimony, rehabilitative alimony, child support, a vested special equity in property, and an award of exclusive possession of property.
As considered by the trial court, these remedies are interrelated; to the extent of their eventual use, the remedies are part of one overall scheme.JACOB C.
ROSIER and ELIZABETH R.) 1 CA-CV ROSIER, individually and as) Co-Successor Trustees of the) DEPARTMENT D Patricia Rosier Trust,)) MEMORANDUM DECISION Plaintiffs/Appellees,) (Not for Publication -) Rule 28, Arizona Rules v. Justia › US Law › Case Law › Florida Case Law › Florida Supreme Court Decisions › › Diffenderfer v.
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14, briefs, keyed to casebooks. Top-notch customer support. Top-notch customer support. The right amount of information, includes the facts, issues, rule of law, holding and reasoning, and any concurrences and dissents. ACKSON: Dr. John M. Cook died peacefully at the Ohio State University Ross Heart Hospital on Saturday, March 5, He was born in Baltimore, Ohio, on February 16, to the late David and Grace (Lewis) Cook.
(a) Route 5 south of San Juan Capistrano to Route near El Rio except for the portion of Route 1 relinquished: (1) Within the city limits of the City of Dana Point between the western edge of the San Juan Creek Bridge and Eastline Road at the city limits of the City of Laguna Beach. constantly said that Peter “killed his wife” and that he confessed to “killing his wife.” In a “Sunday Special” the newspaper said that Peter went on television to “drum up publicity” for his manuscript in hopes .